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How Does the Law 
Recognize Work? 
When a parent goes on maternity or parental leave from regular employment 
to give birth to, breastfeed or care for and nurture an infant, is that parent 
working? What do we understand to be work? When women are engaged in 
both market work and motherwork, what messages do we as a society send 
about their work? Over the past quarter century courts in Canada have had 
occasion to consider some of these questions and their pronouncements have 
been indicative of the position of mothers in Canadian society. This paper will 
consider a number of recent cases that have dealt with women's dual roles as 
mothers and workers, cases that show that despite some signs ofprogress, there 
is much that has not changed in 25 years. 
In 1978 the Supreme Court of Canada decided the case of Bliss v. A. G. 
Canada which held that a woman who had been refused Unemployment 
Insurance' benefits because of her pregnancy was not discriminated against on 
the basis of sex.2 For a decade thereafter a formalistic model of gender equality 
restricted women's ability to challenge discrimination on the basis of preg- 
nancy. Remarkably, just a decade later in Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd, the 
Supreme Court had the opportunity to revisit the issue and recognized that a 
woman who was discriminated against because ofpregnancywas discriminated 
against on the basis of sex and that such discrimination was contrary to both 
human rights legislation and the equality guarantee of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.Broad language noting the weight of the burden of 
chiidbearing borne by women proclaimed that it was "unfair to impose all of the 
costs of pregnancy upon one half of the population." The court noted "[tlhat 
those who bear children and benefit society as a whole thereby should not be 
economically or socially disadvantaged seems to bespeak the ob~ious."~ Despite 
such broad language (which might have suggested that discrimination against 
58 1 Volume 6, Number 2 
mothering was a thing of the past) a number of recent cases seem to be taking 
us back to the dark days of Bliss.' Kelly Lesiuk and Joanne Miller are just two 
of the women whose attempts to shape or extend our understandings ofwhat 
gender equality means for mothers have been rejected on the basis offormalistic 
Bliss-type reasoning . 
Kelly Lesiuk is a registered nurse. Already the mother of a three year old 
child, she was employed on a part time basis when she became pregnant with 
her second child. On  her doctor's advice in April 1998 she stopped working and 
applied for E1 maternity benefits. She was turned down because she had 
worked only 667 hours in the qualifying period instead of the 700 hours 
required to demonstrate work force attachment. Ms. Lesiuk unsuccessfully 
appealed this denial to a Board of Referees. On a further appeal to the Umpire 
she argued that the 700-hour eligibility requirement violated her equality 
rights. The Umpire agreed, finding that the requirement discriminated against 
those whose childcare responsibilities made it more difficult to meet the 
requirement, predominantlywomen who are employed an average of 30 hours/ 
week compared to men's average of39 hourdweek. The Umpire also found that 
the eligibility requirements undermined the human dignity of women by 
promoting the view that women are less capable or valuable as members of 
Canadian society because they must work longer to demonstrate their attach- 
ment to the workforce. The Attorney General sought a review of the Umpire's 
decision by the Federal Court of Appeal, and in January 2003 that court held 
that Kelly Lesiuk was not discriminated against by the eligibility requirements 
of the Employment Insurance scheme because her human dignity was not 
demeaned.6 
Just months earlier, in October, 2002, Joanne Miller was told by the 
Federal Court ofAppeal that she was not entitled to full employment insurance 
benefits when she lost her job because she had previously received maternity 
and parental benefits in the same benefit period. The court held that the 
Unemployment Insurance Act which limits receipt of regular benefits when 
claimants have already received special benefits was not contrary to the equality 
provisions of S. 15 of the Charter $Rights and Freedoms. Ms. Miller had been 
employed at the Native Canadian Centre of Toronto since 1992. In 1995 she 
became pregnant with her second child. She went on maternity leave from her 
employment in March of 1996 and applied for and received 15 weeks of 
maternity benefits and ten weeks of parental benefits. Four days before she was 
due to return to her job, Ms. Miller was informed by her employer that her 
position was no longer available. Finding herselfjobless, she applied for regular 
unemployment insurance benefits to replace her income whiie she sought new 
employment. On the basis of the weeks of insurable employment, a claimant 
in Ms. Miller's situation who became unemployed would ordinarily be entitled 
to 40 weeks ofregular benefits. However, since Ms. Miller had alreadyreceived 
25 weeks of maternity and parental benefits, she was only entitled to 15 weeks 
of regular benefits because the operation of the Act has the effect of deducting 
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from the maximum number of weeks of entitlement for regular benefits any 
weeks of special benefits received during the same benefit period.7 
In the cases of Lesiuk and Millev as well as the other related cases, the courts 
and tribunals appeared to have been unaware of the context within which - - 
women engage in market work and motherwork. This was so in spite of the 
ample evidence of women's lived experiences that was presented by the 
intervenors in these cases.8 Women in Canada continue to experience eco- 
nomic disadvantages relative to men as evidenced by the continuing wage gap. 
Women on average earn anywhere from $0.76 to $0.52 for every dollar earned 
by men, depending upon the way in which the figures are calculated. Only 
unmarried women aged 25 to 44 who are employed fulltime approach men's 
earnings. These women earn $0.97 for every dollar fulltime employed men 
earn. Women also tend to work in traditionally female occupations with 
correspondinglylower "female" rates ofpay. In 1992,70 percent of all employed 
women worked in teaching, nursing and related health professions, clerical, or 
sales and service. Women are also disproportionately among the members of 
the part time workforce? Structural characteristics of the workplace also serve 
to marginalize mothers as workers. Inflexible work hours and increased 
employer demands for overtime and shift work act as barriers to people with 
childcare responsibilities. Economic changes and globdization have also lead 
to increased contract and part-time work, particularly in sectors of the economy 
where women have traditionally found ernpl~yment.'~ The result is increasing 
instability and vulnerability for workers, especially women. 
Even in today's society where 71.4 percent of mothers with children 
under the age of 16 are working fulltime in the paid workforce, women 
continue to shoulder the bulk of the domestic labour associated with caring 
for children and running a household.'' When childcare arrangements fail, it 
is mothers who take time away from work to meet the family's childcare 
responsibilitie~.'~ After a child is born, it is almost always the mother who 
takes leave from her employment to care for the newborn or adopted child. 
In 1998, women represented 98.4 percent of the recipients of maternity and 
parental benefits under the employment insurance scheme.I3 Finally, ad- 
equate access to employment requires adequate access to quality affordable 
chiildcare, a goal we have yet to realize in Canada where a mere third of all 
children with both parents or a lone parent being employed have access to 
licensed space.I4 All of these factors heighten women's vulnerability in the 
labour market, especially at a time of job loss. 
Related to women's disadvantaged position in the workforce is the fact that - - 
women are also generally at a greater risk of poverty than men and, when in 
poverty, experience a greater depth of poverty. Women who are already 
disadvantaged as racialized women, aboriginal women, lone parents, immi- 
grants or disabled women are even more likely to face these risks." 
Recent work by authors in Canada, the United States and Europe now 
reveals that some of the economic disadvantage women experience is attribut- 
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able to the responsibilities many women bear as mothers. Mothers may 
experience a reduction in expected lifetime earnings of as much as 57 percent 
relative to women who do not have children. The value of this loss could exceed 
$US one million. Laws and ~olicies which do not take account of the impact 
of care giving responsibilities on earnings and workforce participation com- 
pound the disadvantage women already experience.I6 
Discriminatory attitudes about women as secondary earners also continue 
to operate. An employed woman is assumed to be supported by her husband 
who is the "real" wage earner. In reality however there are many single mothers 
who don't have husbands or whose former husbands are not paying adequate 
support, many lesbian mothers whose female ~artners also experience discrimi- 
nation in earnings, many women whose earnings are as vital to their families' 
survival as are their male partners'." 
Such discriminatory attitudes were also prevalent in the early 1970s, at a 
time when child care was also less available, and when the time away from paid 
employment after the birth of a child averaged 6.6 years.18 This was the time 
when Stella Bliss had her child. When Stella Bliss became pregnant she was 
fired from her job. Because ofveryhigh eligibilityrequirements she was unable 
to qualify for maternity benefits under the Unemployment Insurance program, 
so she applied for regular benefits for the period of time that she was available 
for work before and after the birth of her child. Even though she met the 
eligibility requirements for the regular benefits she was turned down because 
a provision of the Act denied regular benefits to pregnant women for a period 
of 15 weeks surrounding the expected date of birth. It was this provision that 
Stella Bliss challenged as violating her equality rights under the old Bill of 
Rights. The courts relied on the logic of pregnant persons to find that she had 
not experienced sex discrimination since the Act treated pregnant women 
differently from other unemployed persons, both male and female, "because 
they are pregnant and not because they are women."19 
Such an approach to a question of gender equality is no longer correct in 
law or in policy and was clearly rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Brooh. The same year it decided Brooks the Supreme Court handed down its 
first decision on the equality provision of the Charter and set a course towards 
substantive equality that has evolved in fits and starts over the intervening 
decade.20 The proper approach to equality claims is now accepted as being the 
one set out by the Supreme Court in 1999 in Law v. Canada (Minister of 
Employment andImmigration).21 The court set out an approach to equality that 
focuses upon three central issues: 
(A) whether a law imposes differential treatment between the claim- 
ant and others, in purpose or effect; 
(B) whether one or more enumerated or analogous grounds of 
discrimination are the basis for the differential treatment; and 
(C) whether the law in question has a purpose or effect that is 
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discriminatory within the meaning of the equality guarantee.22 
A proper application of this analysis should have supported a finding that 
the E1 provisions challenged by both Lesiuk and Miller do violate the equality 
rights ofwomen who are mothers. When Joanne Miller lost her job she, unlike 
other workers who found themselves unemployed, was unable to rely on regular 
benefits solely because she had received maternity and parental benefits. The  
Federal Court ofAppeal was unable to see this as differential treatment, noting 
that Miller was treated just like any other recipient of maternity, parental or 
disability benefits and so her claim failed. For Kelly Lesiuk, the differential 
treatment was recognized but the Federal Court of Appeal found that such 
treatment would not offend her human dignity and so her claim failed on the 
basis that her treatment was not discriminatory. In certain respects the 
reasoning of the Federal Court of Appeal in both of these cases echoes the 
reasoning of the Supreme Court in Bliss itself 25 years ago. First, in Bliss the 
court employed a formal approach to equality where likes were expected to be 
treated alike. Second, the court showed great deference to parliament to enact 
laws as it saw fit. Both of these lines of reasoning are also apparent in the Lesiuk 
and Miller cases. 
In Bliss, the Supreme Court noted that men and women who were not 
pregnant were treated dike for purposes of the unemployment insurance 
scheme, and only pregnant persons, who were differently situated, were treated 
differently. Consequently, the denial of benefits to Stella Bliss because she was 
pregnant did not amount to gender discrimination. In Miller and the related 
cases the Federal Court of Appeal noted that men and women are treated 
exactly the same by the impugned provisions, that only people who had received 
maternity or parental benefits were treated differently and thus they are gender 
neutral and not contrary to the claimants' Charter rights.23 What the Court did 
not advert to is that while men too may have their benefits limited, it is in fact 
almost exclusively women who are actually affected. In Lesiuk, the formal 
approach is not so patently obvious, but is present nonetheless. While the court 
accepted that Lesiuk and other part-time workers were treated differently and 
that that differential treatment may have been due to her gender and parental 
status, it held that itwas not discriminatorybecause ultimatelyvery few women 
in parental status were affected and the differential treatment was really 
"between those who work at or above the threshold requirement for hours and 
those who fall short of this thre~hold."~? In both of these cases, as in Bliss, the 
laws had a disproportionately negative effect on mothers but the courts refused 
to recognize that effect as a violation of the claimants' equality rights. 
The deference to parliament evident in Bliss also played out in Miller and 
Lesiuk. In Miller, the court by adopting its reasoning in the earlier related 
decisions, noted that a court should not "engage in constitutional tinkering" 
even when the adverse effects of the impugned provision are not undifferenti- 
ated in their impact."25 In Lesiuk, it was in the analysis under section one of the 
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Charter that the court emphasized that the complexity of the E1 scheme meant 
that the courts ought not to superimpose additional requirements even if they 
may be desirable to address differential impacts of the legi~lation.~~ Yet surely 
the Constitution does require courts to tinker or superimpose additional 
requirements when the laws enacted fail to meet the standard of equality set out 
in the Charter. Parliament may be best suited to set priorities and determine 
eligibility for social benefits, but when it does so in violation of a constitutional 
right, and cannot justify the violation under section one, then it is the role and 
duty of the court to "tinker" with the legislative scheme. Deference is contrary 
to the text and spirit of the Charter as well as the early Charter jurispruden~e.~~ 
Miller and Lesiuk have brought important and difficult cases before the 
courts to try to address the very questions that were raised in the opening of this 
piece. What does gender equality look like for mothers? Can a woman belong 
fully to Canadian society as both a mother and a worker? So far, despite the 
courageous challenges ofwomen like Lesiuk and Miller, the Federal Court of 
Appeal has been unable to answer these questions in any meaningful way. 
Perhaps some of the difficulty for the court in reaching a nuanced 
understanding ofwhat equality might entail for mothers lies in the limits of an 
analysis that requires a claimant to demonstrate a violation of her human 
dignity. Much in the Law approach to equality turns on the concept ofhuman 
dignity. Mr. Justice Iacobucci defined it this way: 
Human dignity means that an individual or group feels self respect 
and self worth. I t  is concerned with physical and psychological 
integrity and empowerment. Human dignity is harmed by unfair 
treatment premised upon personal traits or circumstances which do 
not relate to individual needs, capacities or merits. It is enhanced by 
laws which are sensitive to the needs, capacities and merits of different 
individuals, taking into account the context underlying their differ- 
ences. Human dignity is harmed when individuals and groups are 
marginalized, ignored or devalued, and is enhanced when laws 
recognize the full place of all individuals and groups within Canadian 
society. Human dignitywithin the meaning of the equalityguarantee 
does not relate to the status or position of an individual in society per 
se, but rather concerns the manner inwhich a person legitimately feels 
when confronted with a particular law. Does the law treat him or her 
unfairly, taking into account all of the circumstances regarding the 
individuals affected and excluded by the law?28 
This definition ofhuman dignity sounds fair and in keepingwith the spirit 
of the Charter's substantive equality guarantee. But it has been criticized by a 
number of commentators who have pointed out that notions of human dignity 
pervade many sections of the Charter and that equality comprises something 
more. There is also a fear that human dignity is too loose and malleable a 
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concept to protect the particular kinds of interests that are to be protected by 
section 15.29 Certainly the focus of the Federal Court of Appeal on human 
dignity in both Miller and Lesiuk has been an impediment to their success. In 
both cases the court affirmed that a denial of E1 benefits "could hardy be said 
violat[e] one's essential human dignity;"30 since they did not reinforce the 
stereotype that women should stay home and care for children or suggest that 
women's work is any less worthy of recognition. 
If human dignity has been a stumbling block for equality seeking mothers 
and has been challenged on a theoretical basis as well, then perhaps we should 
ask what is the particular essence of equality that section 15 should be used to 
protect and foster? Denise Reaume has surveyed a range of feminist positions 
to conclude that, despite their differing ~nderstandin~s ofwomen's experiences 
and of strategies to achieve equality, all feminist approaches are concerned with 
the harm of exc l~s ion .~~  She has specifically focused on implicit exclusion which 
occurs when rules or laws are drafied using men as the norm. Such gender 
neutral rules do not encompass the lived experiences ofwomen in their design 
and in their operation they exclude women from full participation in the larger 
society.32 Reaume offers Bliss as the classic example of such implicit exclusion. 
The Miller and Lesiu& cases provide 21" century examples of the same kind of 
implicit exclusion.33 
In a recent and important article Donna Greschner has argued that the 
primary purpose of the equality guarantee is to protect each person's interest in 
belonging, simultaneously, to several communities. The communities that 
everyone may belong to are the universal human community, the Canadian 
political communities and the particular identity communities that may be 
demarcated by sex, race, religion or other enumerated or analogous  attribute^.^^ 
As Greschner notes, the concept of human dignity may protect an individual's 
interest in belonging to the universal human family, but does not go far enough 
to protect his or her other interests in belonging?' She maintains that the 
historical, philosophical and linguistic underpinnings of section 15 all support 
the conclusion that it is intended to protect belonging.36 The complex sense of 
community that characterizes Canadian society is evidence of the rejection of 
assimilation as the only way to belong3' 
Belonging is particularly relevant in the situation where what is at stake is 
a mother's interest in belonging to the "public" sphere of employment, even 
while she also continues to belong in the "private" sphere of child nurture. The 
sense of connection, of a non-autonomous identity that the word "belongingn 
implies, captures the encumbered reality of a mother's experien~e.3~ This 
concept ofbelonging, as it applies in the context oflesiuk, Millerand the related 
cases, crystallizes the sense of injustice that has pushed at least five women in 
the past three years to challenge provisions of the Unemployment Insurance 
Act before the Federal Court of Appeal. These women are asking the court to 
recognize that they are members of the human family, the Canadian political 
communities and are women and mothers. They should not have to choose 
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between being mothers and being workers. They should not be treated as "less 
than full members, and not ~ermitted to participate fully in the opportunities 
and riches of society."39 
Although both Miller and Lesiuk soughtleave to appeal the Federal Court 
of Appeal decisions to the Supreme Court of Canada, they were both turned 
down. This is especially unfortunate because it is vital that the Supreme Court 
provide some guidance and demonstrate what gender equality looks like as it 
applies to women who have responsibilities for bearing and raising children. 
This area ofwomen's gendered lives is one that poses challenges for theorists4' 
and courts dike, and the need to address it properly is vital in promoting 
women's equality. For the reality now is that however integrated women may 
have become into the public spheres oflife, most still continue to have children. 
How we as a society allow for a "fit" between the worker and the mother roles 
ofwomen determines how real equalitywill be for us. The Supreme Court may 
soon be considering an appeal from a Quebec Court of Appeal decision that 
determined that maternity and parental leave benefits paid out under the 
EmploymentInsuranceAct are social welfare payments paid out not for economic 
reasons but because of a personal interruption in empl~yrnent.~' The practical 
result of this is that the federal government does not have the legislative 
authority to establish maternity and parental leave programs but the provinces 
would be free to implement their own schemes.42 This case may provide some 
opportunity to the Supreme Court to speak to the question of "fit" in women's 
mothenvork and market work. Perhaps then it will be possible to breathe life 
into the words of ChiefJustice Dickson in Brooks. "Combining paid workwith 
motherhood and accommodating the chiidbearing needs of women are ever- 
increasing imperatives. That those who bear children and benefit society as a 
whole thereby should not be economically or socially disadvantaged seems to 
bespeak the obvious." 
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